Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis, which was triggered by large writedowns of bank assets related to subprime mortgages, has been labeled as the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression. One distinguishing characteristic of this crisis has been the failure or distress of several large banks across the globe. Some of the large U.S. banks that were affected, and in many cases, had to be rescued by the government included Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual. Many overseas banks, such as BNP Paribas, IKB, RBS, and UBS were also severely affected by this crisis. 1 This effect on banks, in turn, resulted in a severe credit and liquidity crisis in the financial markets. This type of risk, wherein the entire financial system, including several markets and institutions is simultaneously distressed, is generally described as systemic risk. If realized, systemic risk impacts not only financial markets and institutions, but also the real economy as a whole due to decreases in capital supply and increases in capital costs.
Many governments and monetary agencies have expressed concerns about the recent financial crisis and its potential systemic effects and are calling for better management of systemic risk. For example, the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) are considering policy options to deal with systemically important firms; similarly the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. has created a Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and will create an Office of Financial Research (OFR). However, before rushing to policy changes, such as requiring financial institutions to higher capital or liquidity requirements, or regulating prime brokers (King and Maier, 2009) , it is essential to better understand systemic risk and how it can be measured and monitored. For example, in testimony before the House Oversight Committee of the U.S. Congress, Lo (2008) stated that a formal definition of systemic risk is a starting point for regulatory reform, wherein several quantitative measures of systemic risk should be monitored. Acharya (2009) models systemic risk as the correlation of returns on bank assets. Recently, Caruana (2010) examines systemic risk as a negative externality in the cross-sectional and the time dimensions, and discusses financial regulatory policies designed to reduce externalities along each dimension, the role of monetary and fiscal policy, and the national and international policy coordination.
The main contribution of this paper is to analyze the relevance and effectiveness of large banks' stock return correlations as a simple indicator of systemic risk. Correlation is one of several measures that have been proposed by Lo (2008) and Acharya (2009) as indicators of systemic risk. Clearly, high correlations among banks are a necessary condition for systemic failures because a single event is unlikely to cause broad-based dislocation over a relatively short period of time if correlations are low. For example, Das and Uppal (2004) study the effect on portfolio choice of systemic risk. They find that returns on international equities are characterized by jumps that occur at the same time across countries, implying that conditional correlations between equity returns are higher in the periods with higher systemic risk.
In this analysis, we exclusively select bank holding companies (BHCs) and investment banks with total assets in excess of $100 billion as of the last quarter of 2006 and examine their daily stock return correlations. The reason to include the large banks is because they are highly leveraged. Therefore, the correlations among them should be an economically significant indicator. These correlations are estimated for quarterly, yearly, and other sub-period horizons from 1988 to 2008. First, we observe that the average mean and median stock return correlations among these 22 banks have shown an upward trend and have tripled from 1988 to 2008. These findings support the recommendation of Acharya (2009) that prudential regulation should also consider the correlated risk of banks with other banks. On the other hand, stock return correlations among non-bank firms in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) have only increased by approximately 25% over the same period. Second, several correlation spikes have been observed over the aforementioned 21-year period. These spikes are associated with significant economic events, such as the 1998 Russian financial crisis that triggered the collapse of Long Term Capital Management, the 2001 recession, and the 2007 subprime crisis that triggered the recent financial crisis. 2 Interestingly, non-banks also show higher levels of stock return correlations around these times.
We also examine if the increase in correlations are driven by systematic risk or idiosyncratic risk by using the Fama-French three-factor model and a four-factor model which includes the three factors of the Fama-French model and a "bank" industry factor. We find that although on average banks' idiosyncratic risks have been decreasing, there is significant increase in the correlations of banks' idiosyncratic returns suggesting that banks are undertaking more correlated investments, which in turn gives rise to increasing systemic risk.
Our empirical findings on the trend of the correlations of banks' systematic returns and idiosyncratic returns are consistent with the systemic risk-shifting incentive of banks suggested by Acharya (2009) , who argues that banks prefer correlated investments which give rise to an inefficiently high correlation of asset returns in order to survive together, or fail together. Traditional bank regulatory practices are based only on a bank's own risk, which are likely to fail to detect aggregate risk-shifting behavior. We offer clear empirical evidence that the use of correlations of stock returns can offer meaningful insights to banks' individual risk as well as aggregate risk, and thus should be considered in macro-prudential bank supervision.
Another contribution of this paper is to investigate an alternative correlation measure, namely, default correlations based on default probabilities produced by reduced-form, structural, and 2 See Rigobon (2003) for a complete list of dates with large market moves.
hybrid credit risk models. 3 Mixed results can be observed from default correlations for the purpose of monitoring systemic risk. As the subprime crisis began to unfold in 2007, the default correlations produced by almost all of the credit risk models covered in our study did not increase, and in fact, decreased. Although default correlations spiked in the first quarter of 2008, models relying on default correlation movements would be reactive rather than proactive in managing systemic risk. Furthermore, default correlations significantly vary across different default methods. Default correlation results are not included due to space limitations. 4 In sum, our objective is to examine if a "simple" indicator may serve the purpose of monitoring systemic risk. We contribute to the literature by pointing out that stock return correlations are a useful indicator of systemic risk. The pattern of correlation movements, such as spikes, can be used with other measurements to determine the likelihood of systemic failure. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature and discuss the arguments that support the use of stock return correlations as an indicator of systemic risk. Section 3 describes the data collected in this study and the methodology used in the analysis, while Section 4 discusses the empirical results on stock return correlations and default correlations. Section 5 presents the correlations of systematic returns and idiosyncratic returns. Section 6 concludes.
Literature review and supporting arguments
Systemic risk was first investigated in the early 1990s around the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). Since this time, systemic risk has been vigorously investigated and, in particular, has been the focus of many studies since the beginning of the recent financial crisis. De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) provide a very comprehensive survey of the literature that addresses systemic risk. One strand of literature has attempted to define systemic risk. As new literature emerges, there seems to be more disagreement than consensus regarding the definition of systemic risk (Bartholomew and Whalen, 1995; Goldstein, 1995; Kaufman, 1995) .
We believe the following definition of systemic risk should direct the development of systemic risk measures: systemic risk is the likelihood of experiencing a systemic failure, a broad-based breakdown of the financial system that is triggered by a strong systemic event (e.g., a financial institution failure), which severely and negatively impacts the financial markets and the economy in general. 5 This definition also relates systemic risk to how credit risk can be generally measured using the probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and exposure at default (EAD). In this context, systemic risk can be measured by the probability, severity, and exposure of a systemic failure. It is important to distinguish systemic risk from a systemic event and from systemic failure. Systemic risk is not systemic failure, even when such a risk is high. 3 The term default correlation connotes different things in different contexts. Following Jarrow and van Deventer (2005) , we calculate default correlations from the time-series of default probabilities provided by the various default models of Kamakura. 4 These results are available upon request. 5 Our measure aims to indicate systemic risk for financial markets as a whole and not measure the "systemic" importance of an individual bank. Therefore, we do not address the issue of which banks may be more "systemic" than others -for such issues, we refer the reader to papers by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) , Thomson (2009) , and the IMF (2009). Others who similarly try to estimate systemic risk for the financial system include Bartram et al. (2007) . Some papers focus on the financial system as a whole and try to capture financial sector linkages, whereas others focus on the institutional level. Clearly, the former has implications for the latter. Our paper belongs to the former group.
Whether a systemic failure happens or not depends on whether there is a sufficiently strong triggering event and whether that triggering event occurs in a high enough risk environment as to likely cause systemic failure. Systemic risk cannot be completely eliminated, nor is there a desire or need to. It is simply a by-product of financial innovation, as are other types of risk (Lo, 2008) .
Another strand of literature investigates what may cause changes in the level of systemic risk, for example, changes in the level of inter-bank lending (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) , financial system consolidation (De Nicolo and Kwast, 2002) , VaR-induced herding behavior in bank trading patterns (Jorion, 2006) , and the opaque and largely unregulated hedge funds (Chan et al., 2006; Kambhu et al., 2007) .
A third strand of literature aims to develop systemic risk measures for monitoring purposes. We intend to advance this strand of literature with our current study. Systemic risk can be measured for markets as a whole or at the firm level to identify systemically important firms. For both markets and firms, these measures may be direct, using analytical models, or indirect, using indicators that are considered to relate to systemic risk. An example of a direct measure for markets is Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) , who estimate a joint probability of distress, as well as a banking stability index for the financial sector. Similarly, an example of a direct model-based measure of the systemic importance of a firm is the CoVaR measure of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) . Other examples of model-based measures include Acharya et al. (2011) , Allenspach and Monnin (2006) , Aspachs et al. (2007) , Avesani et al. (2006) , Goodhart et al. (2005 Goodhart et al. ( , 2006 , Lehar (2005) , Zambrana (2010) and Zhang et al. (2009) .
On the other hand, the difficulties in measuring systemic risk using models are well documented, and models have frequently been observed to produce results that are counter to priors. Secondly, we do not have an exogenous measure of systemic risk and have to rely on expert judgment and priors to validate the modelbased measures. Therefore, indicator-based approaches have been proposed as a means to indirectly measure systemic risk using indicators that are believed to be related to systemic risk or systemic importance. For example, the IMF/BIS/FSB (2009) proposed using indicators for size, interconnectedness, and substitutability to measure the systemic importance of a firm. Thomson (2009) proposed to use size and the four C's (contagion, concentration, correlation, and conditions) as criteria to determine the systemic importance of a firm. Similarly, our paper proposes that stock return correlation is a useful indicator of systemic risk for markets as a whole. It can also be argued that, while holding the firm level PDs constant, a higher correlation implies a higher joint PD for the system, such that correlation can serve as a useful indicator of systemic risk.
There is also a considerable amount of literature that has investigated bank contagion, which is often discussed in the context of systemic risk; however, most of the empirical investigations therein have been event studies, in which the authors examine banks' reactions (such as risk premiums or stock price reactions) or their timing of reaction to bad news (e.g. Aharony and Swary, 1983; Carron, 1982; Slovin et al., 1999) . These studies provide important evidence of market reactions to various systemic events, but have little implication for an effective measure of systemic risk because they only show the systemic risk around such events. We believe that measuring and examining the correlation of financial institution stock returns over time can serve as an indicator of systemic risk, not only around the time of a triggering event, but also on an on-going basis as the level of systemic risk evolves.
De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) have similarly examined stock price correlations and have found a significant upward trend in the degree of inter-dependency among their sample of large complex banking organizations from 1988 to 1999. In addition, they found evidence that this trend might be caused by financial consolidation activities among these banking organizations. Our paper is different because we show differences in correlation patterns among financial institutions and non-financial institutions and also examine default correlations. Most importantly, we study the relationships among correlation movements, market or triggering events and systemic failure, and the relevance and effectiveness of stock return correlations as an indicator of systemic risk. Finally, our analysis is timely since it covers the recent subprime crisis which is considered to be the most severe financial crisis since the great depression. Therefore our analysis and findings complements and extends the analysis done by previous researchers.
We focus on stock return correlations as an indicator of systemic risk because of their natural advantages. First, unlike most balance sheet or company financial variables, the information reflected in stock prices is typically viewed as forward looking. Because the primary goal of managing systemic risk is to monitor the level of systemic risk on an on-going basis so as to prevent systemic failures and the associated costs, forward-looking indicators, such as stock prices, offer relevant information.
Second, correlation in stock risk premia is shown to explain variations in asset returns better than fundamental variables (Ammer and Mei, 1996) . Indeed, stock prices reflect investors' perceptions about a firm's future profitability, which should reflect the difference between the expected return on total assets and the cost of debt. Expectations on asset returns have played a crucial role in the recent financial crisis. As the default and delinquent rates have soared among sub-prime mortgages, the values of loans and securities backed by such collaterals have been significantly written down. The substantial write-down of these asset values has impacted both the net incomes and capital levels of banks. Inadequate capital levels have sometimes led to regulatory actions, including the closure of banks or mergers and acquisitions arrangements, which are a less dramatic form of bank failures. Investors usually react to their perception of a bank's capital adequacy in the future, which may happen long before a massive write-down takes place. For example, Wachovia's stock prices plummeted 27% on September 26, 2008, the day after the seizure of Washington Mutual, as investors worried that the bank may not have enough capital to weather the credit crunch. In fast moving and efficient capital markets, expectations and new information are quickly reflected in current security prices. Furthermore, because credit risk is still a major risk that banks need to manage, the contagion of credit risk on the banks' asset side should also be watched for potential systemic failure. Stock return correlations serve this function well.
Third, extant literature shows that stock returns can be an effective indicator of default risk. In fact, one popular approach to deriving default correlation among firms' uses the correlation from equity market data as an input (Hull et al., 2004) . The logic behind this approach is that equity is a call option on underlying firm assets (Merton, 1974) , and thus, the correlation of equity returns reflects the correlation of firms' values. Not surprisingly, equity volatilities have been shown to significantly correlate with bond rating downgrades/reviews (Di Cesare, 2006) , bond yields (Campbell and Taksler, 2003) , spread movements of credit default swaps (Norden and Weber, 2009) , and bank fragility (Bongini et al., 2002; Ito and Harada, 2004) .
Finally, in comparison to the other potential systemic risk indicators proposed in the literature, stock return correlations have the additional advantage of being simple, robust, and not subject to model errors or data limitations. Unlike bond yields, CDS spreads, or other market indicators, stock prices have the advantage of being widely traded among market participants over a long history and are easily available on almost every business day for all publicly traded banks. 6 We propose a way in which stock prices may be used along with other systemic risk measures, such as the network approach, the co-risk model, the distress dependence matrix and the default intensity model used in IMF (2009), to help regulators and businesses monitor the level of systemic risk and take appropriate actions in a timely fashion.
Data and methodology

Sample selection
Because our interest is in large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), all bank holding companies with total assets in excess of $100 billion as of the last quarter of 2006 are included in our sample. We also selected investment banks with total assets in excess of $100 billion as of 2006, which included the five largest investment banks (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers) at that time. Because our primary variable of interest is stock returns, we limit our sample to only publicly traded firms. This limitation resulted in a sample of 22 firms. Two of the five former investment banks (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) are now BHCs, Bear Stearns has merged with J.P. Morgan Chase, and Merrill Lynch has merged with Bank of America. Furthermore, there have been BHC mergers between PNC and National City, and Wells Fargo and Wachovia. For simplicity, we refer to the sample of firms as banks. These 22 banks account for a substantial portion of the banking assets in the U.S. The top four BHCs alone account for around two thirds of all banking assets. More importantly, because these banks are the largest and most interconnected, they are most likely to be the source as well as the bearer of the consequences of systemic risk.
Our sample begins in 1988, the year in which the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision first published a set of minimum capital requirements for banks (under what is now referred to as Basel I), and ends in 2008. This time period is relatively long, including 21 years that cover several business cycles and periods of significant changes in banking regulations, and is thus a sufficient period for us to examine how correlations have changed over time. We also have a control sample of non-bank firms that we selected from the Dow Jones Industrial Average to examine how correlations have changed over time for non-bank firms. Our primary focus is on daily returns because they allow for the meaningful calculation of stock return correlations on a short horizon, an important property in the timely measurement of systemic risk. We also estimated correlations using weekly returns. Because the results are very similar to those using daily returns, they are not reported.
Panel A of Table 1 presents the list of banks along with the mean and standard deviations of annualized daily stock returns for four five-year periods (1988-1992, 1993-1997, 1998-2002, and 2003-2007) and 2008. 7 In comparison to shorter horizon, the fiveyear periods contain a large sample of daily stock returns and are less likely to be biased by unique market or economic events, thus allowing us to examine if unconditional correlations have truly changed over time; however, in order to ascertain the robustness of our findings to different time period splits, we also run our analysis using alternate windows that are based on changes in banking regulation and/or economic cycles. Because the results are largely similar, our discussions herein are based on the aforementioned five-year window. We run our analysis year by year and quarter by quarter to capture correlation movements around triggering events. In order to further support our correlation analysis, we also estimate the correlation for the sample of firms in the DJIA to determine if what we observe for banks can also be observed for non-bank firms. Panel B of Table 1 reports the mean returns and standard deviations for the sample of non-bank firms currently in the DJIA.
We can observe the following from Table 1 . For many banks, the mean stock returns in periods 1 and 2 (1988-1992 and 1993-1997) are fairly stable, substantially decrease in periods 3 and 4 (1998-2002 and 2003-2007) 
Methodology
We use three correlation measures in our correlation analysis. These include the usual parametric Pearson correlation and the non-parametric Spearman and Kendall correlations. We estimate correlations using three different correlation measures to ascertain the robustness of our findings and ensure that our measures are not biased by potential non-linear dependencies between stock returns. Since the Pearson correlation is the most often used measure of correlation and our findings are robust based on the Spearman and Kendall correlations, we only report the tables for the Pearson correlations due to space limitations. 8 For each type of correlation, we first estimate the pair-wise correlations for all of the aforementioned 22 banks and then take the mean and the median of these pair-wise correlations bank by bank as well as across banks to obtain our inferences. A signed rank test is applied to test the null hypothesis that the mean or median correlations are equal in two time periods.
Empirical results on correlations
Trend in pair-wise correlations
In Table 2 , we report pair-wise Pearson correlations for annualized daily stock returns in each period and the p-values of a signed rank test of the null hypothesis that the correlations in two adjacent periods are equal. Panel A of the table presents the mean Pearson correlations, Panel B shows the median Pearson correlation of each bank with the rest of the 21 banks, and Panel C presents the mean and median Pearson correlations of each non-bank. The Pearson correlations show a statistically significant increase from period 1 to period 2 for all 18 banks that have non-missing Pearson correlations, and from period 2 to period 3 for all 20 banks that have non-missing mean Pearson correlations. From period 3 The above correlation trending patterns over the five time periods for banks and non-banks are illustrated in Fig. 1 . Regardless of correlation measure (Pearson, Kendall, or Spearman), the mean and median correlations among banks can be observed to steadily rise over time, whereas the mean and median correlations among nonbanks decrease from 1988 to 1992 and from 1993 to 1997 and then steadily increase over time. Except for the Pearson correlations in 1988 Pearson correlations in -1992 Pearson correlations in and 2008 , the correlations among banks are generally higher than the correlations among non-banks in the same time periods. Fig. 2 plots, year by year, the average mean and median pairwise Pearson and Kendall correlations calculated from annualized daily stock returns for banks and non-banks over the entire sampling period of 1988-2008. A few observations can be made from Fig. 2 . First, mean and median correlations are very close for the same type of firm and are based on the same correlation measure. Second, the average Pearson correlations are always higher than the average Kendall correlations, and this pattern holds for both banks and non-banks. Third, despite periods of fluctuations, an increasing trend is obvious in correlations among banks, whereas there is no obvious trend in correlations among non-banks. This Note: Panel A reports the mean of each bank's daily stock returns correlation with the other banks for that time period. p-Values from a signed rank test comparing the correlations between two consecutive periods are reported, 1-2 stands for period 1 and period 2, 2-3 for period 2 and period 3, and so on. Panel B reports the median of each bank's daily stock returns correlation with the other banks for that time period. p-Values from a signed rank test comparing the correlations between two consecutive periods are reported, 1-2 stands for period 1 and period 2, 2-3 for period 2 and period 3, and so on. Panel C reports the mean and median of each firm's daily stock returns correlation with the other firms for that time period.
result confirms the trending pattern for banks and the lack thereof for non-banks that we observed in Tables 2 and 3 . Fourth, the average correlation among banks decreases from 2007 to 2008 based on Pearson correlations and increases slower than among non-banks based on Kendal correlations. This might be due to the unprecedented market interventions in 2008, such as the TARP Program, capital injection, emergency lending from the Fed, governmentassisted mergers and acquisitions, and short-selling restriction on financial stocks.
Finally, there appears to be a regime shift in 1995 for both banks and non-banks. On the one hand, the correlations among banks stay relatively low and are not very volatile from 1988 to 1995, but then later increase to much higher levels and become more volatile. Furthermore, according to Tables 2 and 3, the correlations among banks are not that qualitatively different between periods 1 and 2, and periods 3 and 4; however, these correlations experience material jumps from period 2 to period 3 (and also in 2008, which may be caused by different reasons in comparison to the jump observed from period 2 to period 3). This regime change may partly be explained by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act on November 12, 1999. Provisions that prohibit a bank holding company from owning other financial companies were repealed on that day by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. This repeal enabled commercial lenders, such as Citigroup, to underwrite and trade instruments, such as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations, and to establish so-called structured investment vehicles (or SIVs), that bought those securities. On the other hand, the correlations among non-banks follow a decreasing trend from 1988 to 1995, and then show an increasing trend thereafter. 
Fluctuations in yearly pair-wise correlations
Changes in quarterly correlations
The five-and one-year correlations we have studied thus far reveal the long-term trending and cyclical correlation patterns among banks and non-banks; however, they are not able to shed light on whether daily stock return correlations can be used as an indicator of the level of systemic risk in the financial system at shorter horizons. Given the importance of having a systemic risk measure or indicator that signals the level of risk in a timely fashion, we investigate the movements of stock return correlations among banks for each quarter.
Alternatively, conditional correlations can be estimated using methods like multivariate GARCH or a co-risk measure using 8 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 quantile regressions for extreme returns instead of calculating correlations from daily returns for each quarter (such as Ang and Chen, 2002; Karolyi and Stulz, 1996) . 9 These methods do have their advantages and elegance; however, because of their complexity, uncertainty in model selection and specification, and difficulties in parameter estimation, they are inherently subject to more model risk. Our objective is to examine if a "simple" indicator may serve the purpose of monitoring systemic risk.
4.3.1. Extreme movements in quarterly correlation changes Fig. 3 depicts quarterly correlation changes from the second quarter of 1988 to the fourth quarter of 2008. Despite several correlation spikes, the average correlation change is 5% (median is zero) over the sampling period, with a standard deviation of 29%. Four extreme changes are more than two standard deviations above the mean. In the fourth quarter of 1995, correlation more than doubled, jumping from 14% to 32%. The second largest change occurred in the first quarter of 2007, when correlation nearly doubled, increasing from 35% to 68%. The next largest change occurred in the fourth quarter of 1989, when correlation rose 86%, from 15% to 27%, and the last extreme change occurred in the first quarter of 1993, when correlation increased 71%, from 17% to 29%. Although our emphasis in this study is not to determine the causes of systemic failure, we notice that significant economic and market events did occur around these stock return correlation spikes. Furthermore, these jumps in stock return correlations among financial institutions suggest that it is important to measure and investigate tail dependencies when measuring systemic risk.
Among those abnormal correlation movements that did not turn into systemic events, correlations immediately decreased after the spike to previous levels. This decrease is consistent with the characteristics of stock price behaviors. As stated earlier, stock prices reflect investors' perceptions of a firm's future profitability based on information observed at that time. As more information becomes available, investors adjust their perceptions accordingly and calm down; however, this pattern is not the case during the recent financial crisis. Although the correlation jumped 92% to almost 70% in the first quarter of 2007, with slight ups and downs, it has remained at this increased level for two years.
Not every escalated systemic risk turns into systemic failure. For example, among the last four extreme correlation movements, only the recent movement turned into financial crisis; however, this finding does not necessarily mean that correlation is not a good measurement of systemic risk. As in any other type of risk, it measures the likelihood of the realization of the systemic event. Therefore, an increase in stock return correlation should be interpreted as a higher likelihood of systemic failure in the case of a triggering event occurring, and not necessarily a likelihood of a triggering event or an actual systemic failure. If the stock return correlation is low, a triggering event is unlikely to cause systemic failure. For example, given the same type of triggering event (e.g., a failure of a major financial institution), systemic failure is more likely to happen in the last decade than in the early 1990s due to the significantly higher correlation in recent years. Therefore, the realization of a systemic failure depends on the change of correlation, the level of correlation, and other factors that are not examined in this study (such as triggering events and liquidity).
Correlation patterns during the 2007-2008 financial crisis
In order to zoom in on what happened during the financial crisis period of 2007 and 2008, we report quarterly Pearson correlations in Table 3 . 10 We can make the following observations from Table 3 The events began with a string of major bank write-downs based on subprime mortgage losses on October 16 and raised $7.5 billion from the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority on November 27. The third quarter of 2008 exhibits the greatest number of (11) market events during the eight quarter period, ranging from a run on deposits at IndyMac on July 11 after the FDIC took over, to Lehman's announcement of a $3.9 billion loss in the third quarter on September 10 and their filing for bankruptcy on September 15, to WaMu's closure by OTS on September 25. Therefore, we consider the number of market events as a reasonable proxy for the realized level of systemic risk.
From Panel A of Fig. 4 , it appears that there are some comovements between stock return correlations and the number of market events. Correlation peaks often coincide with the number of market events. For example, a peak in the average mean and median Pearson and Kendall stock return correlations occurred in the third quarter of 2008, which is the quarter with the largest number of market events, and a correlation trough occurred in the second quarter of 2008, which is the quarter with only two market events. This pattern is especially obvious based on the Kendall correlation, but is rather mixed across different default correlation measures based on the reduced-form, structural and hybrid credit risk models, as shown in Panels B, C and D, respectively, in Fig. 4 .
Whether the observed increase in stock return correlations is driven by the systematic component of returns due to common factors or it is driven by the idiosyncratic (or the unsystematic) component of returns can help us understand better why the correlations can serve as a useful indicator of systemic risk. High and increasing correlations in the idiosyncratic bank specific component should be paid particular attention because it increases systemic risk or probability of joint failure. That is what we examine in the next section. 1988Q2 1989Q2 1990Q2 1991Q2 1992Q2 1993Q2 1994Q2 1995Q2 1996Q2 1997Q2 1998Q2 1999Q2 2000Q2 2001Q2 2002Q2 2003Q2 2004Q2 2005Q2 2006Q2 2007Q2 2008Q2 % 
Systematic risk vs. idiosyncratic risk
The increasing trend of stock return correlations could be due to increases in systematic risk as the financial industry continues to consolidate (De Nicolo and Kwast, 2002) . 11 On the other hand, Acharya (2009) suggests that even when the level of idiosyncratic risk (or individual bank failure) reduces, aggregate risk may still rise if banks elect to invest in correlated assets, which accentuates systemic risk. In order to determine whether the increased correlations are driven by correlations of systematic or idiosyncratic returns, we disaggregate the stock returns to a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component by applying the standard Fama-French three-factor model. For robustness check, 11 We would like to thank the anonymous referee for this suggestion.
we also use a four-factor model in which a bank index is added to the Fama-French three-factor model. The three factor model includes the excess return on the market index, the small minus big (SMB) premium which is a size factor and a high minus low (HML) factor which is based on book to market ratios, representing a premium for value over growth firms. Fama and French (1993) provide detailed discussions of these factors and how they are estimated. The website referred to in Footnote 16 has details about these factors. The empirical evidence in that paper as well as others indicates that these factors are able to explain cross-sectional variations in the systematic risk of U.S. firms. In forming industry portfolios, there are different levels of industry aggregation possible. We select the bank index based on 48 industry portfolios since that captures the returns on bank stocks up to a four digit SIC code. We regress the daily returns of the bank's stock on these three and four factors and analyze the betas (the systematic risk), the error terms (the idiosyncratic component) as well as the R-squares. The regressions are estimated separately for each bank for each time period of interest. Fig. 5 presents the average idiosyncratic returns over the subperiods retrieved from the three-factor model and the four-factor model, respectively. Basically, they are the percent of "unexplained sum of squares" (i.e., one minus the R-squared). We use the "bank" industry portfolio provided by French to calculate the excess returns of the "bank" factor. 12 Both equally weighted returns and value weighted returns are examined and the results are qualitatively the same. Therefore, we only present the results with equally weighted index hereafter. The trend shown in Fig. 5 clearly suggests that banks' individual risks are declining over time, a finding similar to De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) . Adding an additional banking industry factor, however, does not increase the explanatory power. It suggests that the "bank" industry factor does not capture any significant amount of commonality of the banks included in our sample of the largest financial institutions in U.S.
We then calculate the pair-wise correlations of banks' systematic (explained) returns and idiosyncratic (residual) returns, respectively, as we have done for stock returns in the previous sections. To save space, we only present the mean and median correlations using Pearson, Kendall and Spearman methods in Figs. 6 and 7. 13 Fig . 6 presents the average pair-wise correlations of banks' systematic returns. Although there is an increasing trend, the magnitude is very small. For example, except for the Kendall correlations, the correlations of banks' systematic returns increase steadily from the lower 90% during period 1 (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) to its peak of 99% during period 4 (2003-2007) , and start to decline in 2008.
12 Please see http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html#Research. We use 48 industry classifications. 13 The detailed results and tables are available from the authors upon request. While the level of Kendall correlations is lower, it shows similar pattern as the other correlations. Fig. 7 shows the average pair-wise correlations of banks' idiosyncratic returns. There is a significant increase during period 3 (1998-2002) . Specifically, the average of the Pearson correlations of the mean idiosyncratic returns increases from 11% in period 2 to 26% in period 3. Although it decreases slightly to 22% in period 4, it is still much higher than the 6% in period 1. The significant increase in the correlations of banks' idiosyncratic returns suggests that while banks' average idiosyncratic risks have declined as suggested in Fig. 5 , they may have had increasingly correlated investments, which may lead to higher systemic risk as manifested in the higher correlations of banks' idiosyncratic risks. Note, however, the figures shows that unlike correlations of stock returns, correlations of systematic and idiosyncratic returns do not increase monotonically over time, indicating that there may be other factors at play. What drives these trends would a fruitful topic for future studies.
Our empirical findings on the trend of the correlations of banks' systematic returns and idiosyncratic returns are consistent with the aggregate risk-shifting incentive among banks-they prefer an inefficiently high correlation of asset returns in order to survive together, or fail together (Acharya, 2009) . Our findings are also consistent with De Jonghe (2010) who addresses the issue using a tail beta and shows that non-interest generating activities increase banks' tail beta. Traditional bank regulatory practices focus on prevention of individual bank failures. That has changed since the crisis and we offer clear empirical evidence that the use of correlations of stock returns can offer meaningful insights to banks' individual risk and aggregate risk, and thus should be useful for macro-prudential bank supervision. The fact that increase in correlations is driven by the idiosyncratic component provides further support for the use of the stock returns.
Conclusions
By analyzing the trends and fluctuations of daily stock return correlations and default correlations among 22 U.S. bank holding companies and investment banks, we find that daily stock return correlation is a simple, robust, forward-looking, and timely systemic risk indicator. It captures the trend as well as the fluctuations in the levels of systemic risk in the U.S. economy. An additional advantage of this simple indicator is that it is not subject to the model specification errors and data limitations that other potential systemic risk measures may face. Furthermore, this indicator can be easily estimated for non-bank and non-US financial institutions. Our finding that the idiosyncratic risk in the banking sector has become more correlated provides further support that the systemic risk in the banking system has increased since these higher correlations indicate a higher joint probability of failure during times of stress.
Our findings on stock return correlations should help regulators and businesses better understand and monitor systemic risk. First, systemic risk always exists. Like other types of risk, it is a byproduct of financial activity. However the level of systemic risk can and does vary over time, which has been our focus. Therefore, a better management of systemic risk calls for an ongoing monitoring of the movements of risk measures. Second, we observe that there has been a shift from a low systemic risk regime to a high systemic risk regime since 1996. The average correlation is above 0.5 during this period, which has created a high-risk environment in which a triggering event might cause systemic failure. Third, unusual movements of systemic risk, especially upward movements, should be more closely watched. Therefore, we recommend that systemic risk regulators such as the FSOC monitor daily stock return correlations among financial institutions on a continual basis. Although our emphasis in this study is not to determine the causes of systemic failure, we notice that significant economic events did occur around stock return correlation spikes.
Once an indicator of systemic risk is established, future research could explore the causes of systemic risk and ways to prevent financial crisis. For example, what caused the regime shift of correlations in 1995 and 1996? If it is true that banks choose to be highly correlated so as to survive together and avoid dying alone (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008) , what could be done to reduce such motivation? Can consolidation, which contributed to the increases in stock return correlations among financial institutions in the period of 1988 -1999 (De Nicolo and Kwast, 2002 , also explain the trend and cyclical patterns after 1999 that we have documented in this study? These are important issues in managing systemic risk and mitigating the disruptive effects caused by systemic failure and are good topics for future research.
